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CLASHING IDENTITIES IN PUBLIC SPACE1
Abstract
The article analyses the manifestations of underlying identity conflicts in the social
spaces of Catalonia, chiefly Barcelona, encountered in the streets, on the sidewalks,
motorways, buildings, or beaches. The study focuses on elements that made their
appearance after the illegal Catalan independence referendum of October 1st, 2017.
Relying on participant observation, the author shows Catalan public space as a domain
of semantic and polysemous game, in which struggle for freedom and free speech
is the core element.
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From a political standpoint, Catalonia today is one of the prime hotspots
of conflict in Western Europe. The events of recent months resulted not only
in profound social and political divisions between Spain and Catalonia; deep
rifts emerged within the Catalan community itself. A cultural war of symbols
is waged on the streets, and its habituation constitutes a valuable source for
investigations into the nature and form of contemporary Catalan national-
ism. The principal thesis I would like to advance, is that following the illegal
independence referendum of October 1st, 2017, Catalonia has become a poly-
semous social and cultural space, where adherents and opponents of Catalan
independence engage in daily interactions.
I believe that the polysemous game played as part of the right to public
expression of one’s views (freedom of speech), is a key to understanding
current political and social developments in that country. I am particularly
interested in the manifestations of the inner Catalan rivalry involving sym-
bols, signs, and flags, as well as in the extent to which they partake in the pro-
cess of social engineering that Catalan community is subjected to; the degree
to which they represent a more or less rational materialization of the Catalan
el fet diferencial will be examined as well.
Although the article is concerned with the instances of the quotidian war
of symbols, I omit La Diada (September 11th) and the Spanish National Day
(October 12th), during which symbols of Catalonia and Spain are paraded
with particular intensity. This is a deliberate expedient, as I concentrate on
the use of such emblems in everyday space (profanum), beyond the celebra-
tory context (sacrum) which those days impose. In daily life, the streets of
Barcelona, its buildings, pedestrian crossings, squares, thoroughfares, as well
as the attire of the inhabitants of the Catalan capital become a slate on which
the identity conflict in Catalonia is recorded. Supporters of independent
Catalonia, seeking to mark the space around, fill it with symbols independ-
ence as well as those denoting Spanish oppression. On the other hand, people
who oppose Catalan secession introduce tokens of Spanish unity. The streets
of Barcelona are replete with esteladas, Catalan independence flags, banners
with the slogan “Free political prisoners” (Llibertat presos polítics) (Fig. 1),
demanding the release of politicians arrested by the Spanish authorities as
responsible for the attempted secession. Many persons decorate their clothes
with a yellow ribbon (Cat. llaç groc, Sp. lazo amarillo2) in a gesture of solidarity
                              
2 The more widespread Spanish variant is used throughout this text. The same applies in the
case of the official and pro-independence flag of Catalonia (respectively: señera/as and estelada/as).
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with the detained. The facades of numerous buildings bear banners with pro-
independence slogans. Other peculiar forms of expressing defiance towards
the policies of Madrid include adding “Republic of Catalonia” (República
catalana) to signs indicating street names (Fig. 2), painting pedestrian cross-
ings so that they resemble the estelada or erecting yellow crosses inscribed
with “Freedom” (Llibertat) and “Democracy” (Democràcia) at roundabouts
and beaches. At the same time, the cityscape has no shortage of Spanish flags,
(Fig. 3) banners and slogans proclaiming “Long Live Spain!” (¡Viva España!),
which convey public support for the idea of Spanish unity. The estelada may
predominate in the Catalan public space, but it has not ousted Spanish flags,
which do have their place there.
Although this paper is concerned primarily with the public space in Bar-
celona, much the same can be observed throughout Catalonia, both in larger
cities and in smaller localities; the intensity of the manifestations varies from
neighbourhood to neighbourhood and from place to place. For instance, in
the Campclar quarter in Tarragona, Spanish flags visibly prevail, while the
estelada is hardly ever seen. The quarter was established in the 1960s, fol-
lowing the influx of immigrants from Andalucía and Estremadura, as well as
Morocco later. Despite being a stronghold of constitutionalists, adherents of
Catalan independence also live there3. The important thing is that one should
not all too readily embrace the oversimplified notion that only native Cata-
lans desire independence, while supporters of unity can be found solely
among immigrants. Not every Catalan wishes for secession, just as not every
immigrant is in favour of maintaining the union with Spain. Furthermore,
the Catalan war of symbols reverberates across the country, which may be
easily inferred from the mass presence of state flags in the cities and towns
throughout Spain.
FROM PICNIC NATIONALISM
TO THE WAR OF SYMBOLS
It has become customary to emphasize that Catalan nationalism today
assumes the form of a holiday and family spectacle evinced most eloquently
by La Diada. According to Ruiz-Domènec, “these demonstrations have now
become family gatherings, much in the nature of a fete: fathers and sons,
                              
3 Tedó 2018, p. 13.
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grandparents and children ‘unite in a group’ to celebrate the values of the
nation”4. That picnic-like atmosphere which typified independence rallies in
2012-2017, changed radically after the illegal referendum of 2017. Two things
ensued: “adherents of independence were outraged, the defenders of the
constitution woke up”5. Thus, the war of symbols broke out in Catalonia for
earnest. The sides in that singular war aspire to seize the space, to remove
and erase an alien symbol to put one’s own in its place. The contest taking
place in the Catalan streets today is all about visibility, as Catalonia has
become what Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka defined as a “society of icons”6,
whose space powerfully saturated with images. According to Sztompka
“they are endowed with significance by the author, and the purpose is
either intensely expressive, attempting to elicit a sensation or experience,
or communicative, in that it endeavours to convey a certain communication”7.
The example of Barcelona shows that these objectives are not mutually exclu-
sive: they communicate things on the one hand (unity of Spain or secession
of Catalonia) whilst being highly emotionally charged on the other (there are
groups who put up independence symbols, and groups which remove them).
Just as politicians compete using platforms, declarations and reciprocal accu-
sations as weapons, so does the Catalan community vie for ascendancy in
their space. The elements in that contest include streets, houses, vehicles
(cars, motorbikes, bicycles) motorways, beaches, railway stations, facades of
private and public buildings, football stadiums and the human body as well.
The nomenclature used in Catalonia no doubt deserves attention, as it
clearly divides the community into two opposing and hostile factions8. The
constitutionalists and unionists (constitucionalistes, unionistes), wishing to
uphold Spanish constitution of 1978 and the unity of the Spanish nation are
one of those. Confronting them, there are separatists (separatistas) or adher-
ents of independence (independentistas), who invoke the illegal referendum
of October 2017 to question current political solutions and strive for a sepa-
ration from Spain. Persons who remove symbols and banners which demand
freedom for “political prisoners” and support the creation of the Catalan
Republic are called fascists and/or terrorists (feixistes, fatxes, terroristes) by
                              
4 Ruiz-Domènec 2014, p. 112.
5 Sàlmon 2018.
6 Sztompka 2012, p. 15.
7 Ibidem.
8 The nomenclature has become established in social circulation and tends to be widely used in
Spanish media. Cf. Tensión en Mataró 2018.
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their adversaries. It was with those words that they were described by former
president of the Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont, in his Twitter feed. Referring
to the events in the Catalan town of Verges, where a group of masked indi-
viduals tore down yellow ribbons and esteladas, he wrote:
This mode of action is terrorism pure [highlighted by this author]. Edged weapons,
shirts, night operation. The organized groups which commit those acts are crimi-
nal gangs... Meanwhile, peaceful, honourable and democratically-minded people
are in prisons, because they have held a referendum9.
On the other hand, those who sport yellow ribbons (lazos amarillos), place
banners or placards reading “Free political prisoners” in the public space,
hang out esteladas or put up the yellow crosses tend to be called using the
newly coined lazis, lazistas or catalazis, designations which combine three
Spanish words: lazo (ribbon) catalán (Catalan) and nazi (Nazi). The com-
parisons between supporters of Catalan independence and Nazis often
take a vivid visual form online, where one encounters likenesses of Carles
Puigdemont and Quim Torra (current president of the Generalitat) in Nazi
uniforms or with a swastika in the background.
As already noted, the demonstrations associated with the Catalan Diada
contributed greatly to radicalization of public sentiments, in particular dur-
ing the 2013 celebrations, when a 400-kilometre-long human chain (Vía
Catalana) was formed, becoming a symbol of the Catalan struggle for inde-
pendence. However, the activities of those who champion independence have
roused those inhabitants of Catalonia who consider themselves Spaniards as
well and see no point in pursuing independence. The daily flagging of space
by the Catalan nationalists encouraged opponents of secession to do likewise.
That very interaction may be seen as the inception of the Catalan war of
symbols. Since La Diada was celebrated with increasing panache, regular
counter-displays have been organized in response, culminating on October
12th, the National Day of Spain. The latter are a proof that the idea of inde-
pendence is not uniformly supported by the entire Catalonia. Still, the wave
of backlash, involving symbolic acts of hanging out Spanish flags, removal of
independence-related symbols or creation of dedicated pages in social media
to expose the absurdities of secessionism spilled really wide only when the
Catalan aspirations materialized in the shape of illegal referendum and
the decision of the Catalan parliament, which in a secret ballot voted for the
establishment of an independent Republic of Catalonia.
                              
9 Puigdemont 2018.
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THE ESTELADA VERSUS THE ROJIGUALDA.
THE FLAG WAR
The scale of emotion that national colours can elicit in Spain is very well
reflected in the tweets posted by the current prime minister of Spain, Pedro
Sánchez, with which he commemorated the victims of the Barcelona terrorist
attack two years ago. In the first tweet, published in Spanish, contained the
national emblem and flag of Spain which accompanied Sánchez’s appeal for
unity of the Spanish nation in the face of terrorism and barbarity, and called
for solidarity with the victims. In the second tweet, which communicated the
same but in Catalan, the emblem and the flag of Spain were lacking10. The
missing elements were restored following angry response of the online com-
munity, while the premier’s retinue claimed a “human error without a politi-
cal intention, which has been remedied as soon as it came to light”11. Given
the circumstances in which Pedro Sánchez came to power and his attitude
towards Catalan nationalism, the explanation seems hardly credible. That
was one of the many examples demonstrating the significance which the na-
tional flag has gained in Spain. At the moment, there is no Western European
state where the official flag is an object of ridicule and acts of vandalism; the
flag war rages on in Catalonia. Today, the rojigualda (flag of Spain) has its
rival in the estelada, which symbolizes Catalonia’s striving for independence
and clearly supplants the official señera.
Early harbingers of the war of symbols could be seen during the 1992
Olympics in Barcelona, which were a “forest of symbols, a world anthology of
flags, anthems and signs of belonging”12. Joan Crexell observes that before
1992, Catalonia had indeed had numerous opportunities to make an appear-
ance on the international stage and show itself to the world, but all those
occasions, including world exhibitions in 1888 and 1929, the International
Eucharistic Congress of 1952, or the world football championship in 1982,
which took place at the capital of Catalonia, coincided with the periods when
anything that was Catalan was subject to persecution or suppression. During
the Olympic Games in 1992 things were different, as the power in Catalonia
had been held since 1980 by the nationalists from Convergència and Unió.
The situation was thus exploited for international promotion of Catalonia13.
                              
10 Sánchez 2018a, Sánchez 2018b.
11 Pedro Sánchez quita el escudo 2018.
12 Crexell 1994a, p. 12.
13 Ibidem, pp. 19-20.
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For that purpose, the association Acció Olímpica carried out a series of
campaigns, intended to build the brand of Catalonia. Journalists covering
the Games would receive a publication entitled “Barcelona News”, in English,
French, or Spanish, containing information about Catalonia as a nation and
about Barcelona itself. Announcements appearing in newspapers and other
media stated that “No one’s going to do it for you” (Ningù no ho farà per tu),
thereby urging people to hang out the Catalan señera and slogans such as
“Freedom for Catalonia”, in order to advertise Catalan-ness and show the
world that the Olympic Games are in fact held in Catalonia14. Interestingly
enough, the Ajuntament of Barcelona distanced itself from the position, and
encouraged inhabitants of the city to display the flag of the city rather than
the señera15. This prompted a peculiar “civil war on flags” in Barcelona.
According to “El Observador” daily, the Catalan señera proved the dominant
colour during the Games (55.2%), outstripping the Spanish flag (0.7%),
the flag of Barcelona (19.7%), as well as the Olympic flag (24.1%) and the
pro-independence estelada (0.3%)16. The campaign aiming at Catalanization
of the Games was thoroughly successful. The world found out about the
colours of the señera, which during that time flew all over the Catalan capital.
Journalists also received a video recording with the song “Free Catalonia
from Spain” by Celdoni Fonoll, from which they could learn that in the
course of its history Catalonia, its language, people, and institutions were
persecuted. A book titled “Catalonia 92. A European Nation”17 was available
as well. Moreover, Acció Olímpica would encourage citizens to hang senyeras
and slogans demanding “Freedom for Catalonia” on the route of the Olympic
torch as it travelled through the region18. Catalan became the language of the
Olympics, along with French, English and Spanish. During the opening and
closing ceremonies, when the royal couple appeared in the VIP box, the
Catalan anthem Els Segadors and the national anthem of Spain were played
in succession, all against the colours of Spain, Catalonia and Barcelona flying
in the background19. This owed to a compromise between the Catalan
authorities, the royal court and the central government20. According to José
Antich, king Juan Carlos overshadowed the incumbent president of the
                              
14 Ibidem, pp. 50-51 and 124-125.
15 Ibidem, pp. 125-133.
16 Ibidem, p. 140.
17 Ibidem, pp. 80-81.
18 Ibidem, p. 105.
19 Ibidem, p. 84.
20 Antich 1994, p. 283.
STUDIA EUROPAEA GNESNENSIA 18/2018 · LUDZIE I MIEJSCA
252
Generalitat Jordi Pujol in media coverage. The royal pair and the Spanish
sportspersons celebrating Spanish successes were the sight one saw in the
media most often. One journalist went as far as making a historical compari-
son, asserting that “it was is if the audience were subordinated to the phan-
tasm of Philip V [Bourbon], but without the need for armed coercion”21.
In the present political circumstances, no such compromise would be pos-
sible. King Felipe VI of Spain arouses negative emotions among supporters of
independence, especially after his televised address on October 3rd, 2017, in
which he spoke for the unity of Spain and restoration of order in Catalonia.
Incidents took place as Felipe VI attended the opening of the Mediterranean
Games in Tarragona in June 201722, and during his visit to Barcelona on
August 17th, 2018, where he came to commemorate the victims of the terror-
ist attack two years prior23. Acts of burning the pictures of the royal pair and
the Spanish constitution have also been reported in Catalonia.
While during the 1992 Olympics the percentage share of the Spanish flags
and flags symbolizing independence in the space of Barcelona was negligible,
the situation has changed substantially since then. The estelada predomi-
nates, competing for space and visibility with the national flag of Spain.
There can be no doubt that the flag campaign in 1992 showed Catalans that
undertakings of the kind do pay off. The extensive coverage of the Barcelona
Games in mass media was a particularly significant element; some even
believe that the Olympics became one of the major international spectacles as
a result24. Thanks to the Games, Catalans found it much easier to transition
from hanging out señeras and “Freedom for Catalonia” banners to hoisting
the independence-affirming esteladas and signs demanding “Llibertat presos
politics”. Jordi Canal argues that the independence process in Catalonia
brought about changes in how flags are customarily used:
For some time now, the senyera and the estelada have not been put out on the bal-
conies of the apartments of Catalans only when the calendar dictates, in particular
on the days of La Diada, St George’s Day and local holidays, but remain hanging
there permanently. The Catalan cityscape is changing. The strategy of visual occu-
pation of the public space seems evident25.
Today, the flag war in Catalonia is a daily practice, especially since the
2017 referendum. I recall that during one of my first stays in Barcelona (2006
                              
21 Ibidem, p. 275.
22 Palau 2018, p. 6.
23 Baquero 2018.
24 Ibàñez and Fuentes, Chico and Maquieira 1988, p. 11.
25 Canal 2018, pp. 323-324.
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and 2008), there were few flags, and those in evidence were the señeras,
the official flags of Catalonia. Changes seem to have been taking place in
2011-2016 as the number of señeras grew considerably, but still they could
not be said to have become a dominant element of everyday landscape. Also,
esteladas, could be seen in the city space next to señeras. However, what
I saw in Catalonia during my most recent stay there (March–July 2018)
reflected a radical shift. The flag which now predominates utterly in the
Catalan space is the estelada (Fig. 4), which is sometimes accompanied by the
ikurriña (Fig. 5), the flag of the Basque Country. Flags of Spain are also present,
in combination with the señera and the flag of the European Union (Fig. 6).
Based on thorough observation, one can distinguish eight types of places
where flags are seen in the public space in Catalonia:
1. Estelada-only places. It may be presumed with a high degree of likeli-
hood that they are inhabited by the adherents of Catalan independence or at
least persons who consciously support the idea of separation. Esteladas are
often accompanied by the yellow ribbon (lazo amarillo), which betokens soli-
darity with the representatives of Catalan government (e.g. Carles Puigde-
mont, Jordi Sánchez, Jordi Cuixart, Joaquim Forn or Oriol Junqueras), who
have been arrested after the illegal independence referendum.
2. Places where flags of Spain occur exclusively. It may be surmised that
the areas are populated by those who are in favour of unity with Spain, i.e.
Catalans who recognize themselves as Spaniards as well, or immigrants from
other regions of Spain, who may be living in Catalonia but feel cultural and
mental affiliation with Spain. Some of the rojigualdas feature the representa-
tion of a bull in the centre, drawing on the corrida, one of the most popular
symbols of Spain. Often enough, flags of Spain are accompanied by the flag of
the European Union.
3. Places where flags of Spain occur in combination with señeras. In its
likely that Catalans living in such areas are content with the current legal and
institutional order in Spain, where Catalonia is an autonomous entity and
has its official flag. Sometimes, the flags are heart-shaped and the EU flag is
hoisted next to them.
4. Señera-only places. When the Catalan flag flies alone or it is accompa-
nied by pro-independence slogans and symbol while the rojigualda is absent,
it may be surmised that the location is inhabited by Catalans for whom the
señera is the sole official flag of Catalonia. In this sense, the señera would
constitute an autotelic symbol which draws on the past and simultaneously
implies the striving for independence. This choice may be founded on specific
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arguments: the legend of the Catalan origin of the flag, the significance in
acquired in the 19th century and the prohibitions it was subjected to under
José Primo de Rivera and Francisco Franco. The choice would also be linked
to and echo the flagging of the Catalan space during the 1992 Olympics.
5. Places where esteladas co-occur with señeras. These locations demon-
strate the the official Ctalan flag and the pro-independence flag can co-exist,
despite the distinct significations they convey and generate. The arrangement
may also be interpreted as a double flagging of space with symbols which
underscore Catalan-ness.
6. Places with concurrent flags of Spain and esteladas. In such areas,
adherents of unity and secession appear to live side by side. The presence
of both rojigualdas and esteladas in one place is the best illustration of the
dichotomy and polysemous nature of the Catalan identity conflict.
7. Places where esteladas are displayed together with the ikurriña, flag
of the Basque Country. The combination may indicate a coupling of two
nationalisms, i.e. Catalan and Basque, whose communities strive for inde-
pendence of their respective regions. It might also mean that the person who
hangs the ikurriña next to the estelada is a Basque living in Catalonia and
supports the secession.
8. Places where esteladas are displayed together with the flag of FC Barce-
lona. I decided to distinguish this particular combination in view of the role
and significance of the famous Catalan club. The set, often seen on the balco-
nies and in the windows in Catalonia, may attest to the change of the role
apparently played by the “symbolic, unarmed army of Catalan-ness”26, as
Barça has been described by the eminent Catalan writer Manuel Vázquez
Montalbán. One should perhaps recall that in Franco’s times displaying the
señera was forbidden and the flag of FC Barcelona served as a symbol of all
things Catalan (in fact, Camp Nou was the only place where the señera did
appear, despite the ban) and an emblem of resistance against the regime.
Similarly, increasing numbers of fans of the Blaugrana fly its flag today
together with the estelada, expressing their pro-independence stance which
the club itself is supposed to embody.
There are several kinds of the estelada. The most frequent among those is
the blue estelada (estelada azul), including a blue triangle with a white star;
this variant tends to be most often used by Catalan nationalists. The flag was
created by Vicenç Albert Ballester Camps, who had been inspired by the flags
                              
26 Vázquez Montalbán 2005, p. 169.
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of Cuba and Puerto Rico27, although the first esteladas had indeed appeared
in early 20th century in Cuba28. Visual survey indicates that the type accounts
for as much as 95% of all visible esteladas in the Catalan cityspace. Other
variants include the red estelada (estelada roja), where the triangle is yellow
and the star red, making a reference to Marxist ideology and socialism,
as well as the green estelada (estelada verde) whose green triangle and white
star convey associations with the ecological movement, animal rights and
pacifism (the two latter occur decidedly more seldom in Catalonia)29. The
two remaining types of the estelada are virtually absent in that space:
the communist variant from the 1980s, with a red triangle and yellow star, or
the decade later anarchist version, featuring a black triangle, a red star, and
eight stripes indicating all territories of the so-called Catalan countries. In
2014, a special black estelada (estelada negra) was created for the anniversary
of the 1714 events: all in black, with a white cross of St Eulalia, patron saint of
Barcelona in the centre, an a white star to the left30. During my stay in Bar-
celona, I did see the black estelada on several occasions, displayed on the
balconies and in the windows of Catalan households. The combination of
the white star and the cross of St Eulalia draws in a particular fashion on
what happened in the early 18th century. The defeat in the war of 1714 and
the subsequent repressions that Catalonia suffered are at the very root of the
nationalist revindications.
The dominance of the estelada in the landscape of streets, squares and
crucial sites across Catalonia owes to the pro-independence strategy which
urges one to “hang the estelada on the balcony and do not take it down until
independence has been won”31. Esteladas have become a permanent element
of the Catalan landscape (esteladas perennes)32. It would be legitimate to
claim that the estelada has in fact forced the señera out and took its place –
especially in the symbolic dimension – by virtue of widespread and daily
presence. In this sense, the estelada has gone further than Jordi Pujol could
have thought possible when he encouraged Catalans in the 1980s and the
1990s to make the señera visible in the public space in Catalonia.
                              
27 Segura Just 2016, p. 216; Canal 2018, p. 308.
28 Crexell 2008b, p. 36.
29 Montañés 2017.
30 Hancock 2017.
31 Tobeña 2016, p. 95.
32 Ibidem, p. 97.
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The estelada thus ascends to the rank of metonymy33, as it may be used
to manifest nationality or nation. It serves as a lodestar, showing the Catalan
community the goal of independence. This is what makes the estelada differ-
ent from the señera which, as an official flag of Catalonia, symbolizes its
historical past and the links which bind it to Spain. That distinction between
the señera and the estelada was splendidly encapsulated by Catalan historian
Albert Balcells: “[In the case of the estelada], it is a sign of struggle, which
visually embodies the necessity to fight for national liberation, whereas
the señera is a historical and legal flag of Catalonia”34. Jordi Canal sees it like-
wise, describing the estelada as the “flag of fight” (una bandera de combate)35.
Its special trait is that it implies struggle, a striving to reach a goal (independ-
ence of Catalonia), by severing all historical ties with Spain (Fig. 7). The fol-
lowing principle operates here: the more esteladas there are, the less Spain
there is. Segura Just believes that in the hypothetically independent Catalan
Republic the estelada is certain to replace the señera, which would lose its
importance precisely due to historical considerations, which link it both to
the Francoist period and the Spanish Transición36. A different opinion on the
matter has been voiced by Joan Crexell, an expert on the history of the
estelada. He argues that contrary to what one may think, the estelada is pro-
visional and when Catalonia regains independence the señera will remain its
flag37. Interestingly enough, at the time when it was created and later on as
well, the estelada engendered conflicting opinions; some saw it as a symbol
which divided Catalans38. Javier Barraycoa believes that by replacing the
señera with the pro-independence estelada, the nationalists actually reject
Catalan tradition39.
LAZOS AMARILLOS.
THE WAR OF YELLOW RIBBONS
Apart from the estelada, the yellow ribbon (lazo amarillo) has become an
enduring symbolic feature of the public space in Catalonia in the wake of the
                              
33 Billig 2008, p. 89.
34 Balcells 2008, p. 72.
35 Canal 2018, p. 313.
36 Segura Just 2016, pp. 220-221.
37 Crexell 2008b, p. 92.
38 Crexell 2008b, pp. 92-97, Albertí 2010, p. 253.
39 Barraycoa 2011, pp. 194-195.
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illegal independence referendum. The ribbons, made of plastic or fabric, are
seen in the streets, on the trees, cars, buses, public administration buildings,
private houses, as well as adorn the attire of Catalans. Ribbons as such are not
a novel phenomenon in Spain; blue ones used to symbolize fight with the
ETA, pink ones denote breast cancer action, green ones convey support for
natural conservation, while red ones stand for AIDS awareness. Ribbons had
been employed in Catalonia previously: in the 1990s nationalists used –
señera-coloured ribbons calling for autonomy, or even demanding inde-
pendence. That was at the end of the Francoist era, during the period of
La Transición. The current custom developed in connection with the inde-
pendence referendum. The demonstration against the arrest of Jordi Sánchez
and Jordi Cuixart, presidents of the Assemblea Nacional Catalana y Òmnium
Cultural40, which Barcelona witnessed on October 17th, 2017, contributed
substantially to the propagation of the lazos. As Canal put it, “the yellow
craze attacked and brought the colour to many places in Catalonia”41. From
the very beginning, yellow ribbons carried a reference to the incarceration of
people involved in the Catalan bid for independence, who then tended to be
called “political prisoners” (presos polítics), by way of recollection of the
Francoist regime. Some look even further back and cite the Bourbons, who
sported blue as opposed to the yellow of their Habsburg foes. In 1705,
a number of inhabitants of Barcelona is reported to have attached yellow
ribbons to their hats in an act of protest against the Bourbons42. Given the
role that the year 1714 and Philip V of Spain play in the nationalist and pro-
independence discourse, such associations only add fuel to the Catalan-
Spanish conflict, and drive the war of symbols.
It is a fact that lazos amarillos have conquered the streets of Catalonia,
being truly ubiquitous (Fig. 8). Apart from the balconies and windows of
private apartments, variedly sized lazos (stuck on, painted, or attached) are
visible on buildings (Fig. 9), trees, streets, posts, cars, buses, motorbikes,
bicycles, and sidewalks. Numerous Catalans wear them with their clothes,
usually on the left breast, pinned to the shirts, sweaters or jackets. Also,
a number of professors at the universities of Barcelona can be seen to wear
yellow ribbons daily. Lazos amarillos are the source of intense feelings and
tensions in Catalonia. Some members of the community place them in the
public space, others remove them and throw them out. An ordinary piece of
                              
40 Canal 2018, pp. 334-335.
41 Ibidem, p. 337.
42 Ibidem.
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plastic or fabric has divided Catalans, increasingly often culminating in vio-
lent acts43. It has become a widespread practice to change the yellow ribbon
into a red-yellow-red one, the colours of the Spanish flag (Fig. 10). Specially
formed groups go out into the streets of Catalonia – usually under the cover
of night – and repaint the yellow ribbons adding the red stripes. As a result,
the symbol of support for the imprisoned is transformed into a sign of sup-
port for Spain. The conflict surrounding lazos has grown so severe that some
speak of a “war of yellow ribbons” (guerra de los lazos amarillos) and attempt
to draw maps of the conflict starring the lazo44. Already, one book has been
devoted solely to the phenomenon of the Catalan yellow ribbons45.
What is so special about the yellow ribbon that it manages to stir up such
extreme sentiments among Catalans? According to Ignacio Ravel, lazos
amarillos have become “an instrument of political agitation, social confron-
tation, nationalist consolidation and an expression of the highest nationalist
exaltation”46. Under the pretence of free speech, the ribbons have morphed
into a tool of oppression:
Their core function is to identify emotion and discontent, to point at and stigma-
tize those who do not wear it, to inspire fear in a part of the Catalan society who
still wish to be Spanish. Wearing of the ribbon in Puigdetorra’s Catalonia [from the
names of Puigdemont and Torra] is an equivalent of the extended hand of Spain
after the Civil War, while not doing it – not to mention disposing of it – begins to
be a risky choice”47.
In Blanes (Girona), a restaurant owner and immigrant from Cordoba,
who had lived in Catalonia for 50 years, clashed with the supporters of inde-
pendence who did not like it that he tore down and threw on the ground the
lazos amarillos they had placed on the terrace of his restaurant as part of
the space-marking action48. The video of the incident went viral online.
Another issue relating to the presence of lazos amarillos is noted by
Miriam González, who writes about the invasion of the latter into the social
space of Catalonia. What is more, placing them just anywhere can be danger-
ous, as exemplified by the ribbons drawn on the streets and roads. González
is of the opinion that freedom of speech ends where human life is thus put at
                              
43 There was much publicity following the attack on a woman who, together with her family,
took down lazos amarillos in the vicinity of the Ciutadella park. The attacker abused her verbally
and then hit her, breaking her nose. Gubern 2018.




48 Tensión en Blanes 2018.
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risk49. The danger does not arise when a person exercising their right to free
speech places lazos on their house or public buildings, doing so only to annoy
those who hold different views50.
Only about 30% of the inhabitants of Barcelona – based on my observa-
tion – wear the yellow ribbons. Very often, those are elderly persons above
60, though middle-aged and younger people wear them as well. An elderly
man seen in the city centre wore a cream-coloured sweatshirt with “República
catalana” and a large estelada printed on it. I also saw two girls (in most likely
early teens) one of whom wore a yellow ribbon attached to the backpack,
while the other had it on her blouse. Still, most persons seen in the streets
every day do not sport lazos amarillos. Naturally, this does not mean that
those who choose not to wear it do not support the idea of independent
Catalonia. It may be readily presumed that this is deliberate, as they do not
wish to display it publicly and face any backlash that may ensue.
In Barcelona, every quarter is divided, with various symbols and flags seen
in particular areas (Fig. 11). In those dominated by esteladas one also en-
counters numerous yellow ribbons hung on the trees, posts, or painted on
street surfaces. Carrer Verdi in the Grácia quarter made a great impression in
that respect, with an abundance of symbols relating to the idea of independ-
ence. Invariably, esteladas fly on each side of the street, hanging from the
windows and balconies; there arw multiple lazos, too, put up on the trees or
painted on the walls and streets, along with slogans such as “Llibertat presos
polítics” and “República catalana”. However, isolated flags of Spain can also
be seen there, though an inscription on one of the walls in the quarter pro-
claimed in Catalan that “Grácia is not Spanish”.
STREETS, MOTORWAYS AND BEACHES.
THE CONTEST FOR SPACE
The social space in Catalonia today is a domain of dichotomies and dis-
tinctions, with streets, motorways and even beaches (Fig. 12) becoming a site
of polysemous and semantic duels. In the Catalan conflict of identity there
are two major active factions: the pro-independence movement which marks
the space with symbols expressing their striving for secession, and the pro-
Spanish camp, whose representatives remove such symbols or change their
                              
49 González 2018.
50 Ibidem.
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import. Thus, on the one hand, there are various groups gathered in the
Committee for the Defence of the Republic (Comité de Defensa de la
República – CDR), and the Group for Action and Resistance of Spanish
Citizens (Grupo de Acción y Resistencia de Ciudadanos Españoles – GARCE).
The groups which undertake to combat pro-independence signage are re-
ferred to as the “cleaning brigades” (brigadas de limpieza). Their members,
operating chiefly at night, use social media and mobile apps to communicate
and advise one another of the location of things to be removed. Their actions
are recorded and the videos posted online. The most notorious groups
include “LIBERAGERONA”, “Groc Enlloc”, “Brigada 155”, “Aixeca’t” or
“Segadors del Maresme”. Their efforts against the appropriation of the public
space through pro-independence symbols earned them the label of fascists51
in the parlance of the secessionists. Meanwhile, a number of right-wing
Spanish media compare the methods of the adherents of independence to the
Basque kale borroka, calling it street terrorism (terrorismo callejero) which
subverts constitutional order, disrupts public peace and terrorizes those who
defend the lawful order52.
In the war of symbols, international publicity concerning the situation in
Catalonia plays no mean role. For that end diverse strategies are employed,
just as during the Olympic Games in 1992. For instance, the association Òm-
nium Cultural has a number of coaches present in the social space (chiefly in
the tourist zones), driving around with the slogan “Freedom for all Catalan
prisoners and exiles” painted on the sides in Catalan, Spanish, French, and
English. Available in hotels and bars there are postcards with the slogan
“Free Them All” (in English) as well as T-shirts and stickers with pro-
independence catchphrases53. In the streets of Barcelona, quite often in the
vicinity of its landmark, one sees images this author observed near the Arc de
Triomf, for instance: a policeman beating a person with the following caption
“Spain: fake democracy” (Fig. 13). One also encounters phrases such as
“Good Morning, Republic” (Bon dia República) with a lazo (Fig. 14), painted
on doors or yellow cards admonishing in English: “Wake up! U’know that
Spain is not a democracy?”, which evidently call for the release of political
prisoners. The intended target of the communications are tourists who
                              
51 Fernández 2018, p. 18. It may be worthwhile to note that adherents of unity use the same la-
bel when referring to supporters of independence.
52 Terrorismo callejero 2018, p. 3.
53 de Diego 2018.
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numerously visit Catalonia. University campuses are also sites where pro-
independence slogans thrive.
Throughout Catalonia, it has become a greatly popular practice to dedicate
streets to Catalan “political prisoners” and “exiles”. As examples, one could
quote “Plaça dels Exiliats” or “Carrer Carme Forcadell” with its appended
legend: „President of the Parliament of Catalonia, imprisoned for the referen-
dum of October 1st”, both in Torrelameu (Tarragona)54, or “Carrer dels Presos
Polítics” in Sabadell, with its accompanying inscription “In memory of all
persecuted for defending the rights and freedoms of the people of Catalonia”55.
The illegal Catalan independence referendum of October 1st, 2017, has its
street as well: “Carrer de l’1 d’Octubre” in Cervera56.
Another conspicuous element in the Catalan war of symbols are the
yellow crosses, put up in great numbers by the supporters of secession in
central locations of cities and towns, at roundabouts and beaches, in what is
a peculiar war of crosses. Many are upset that the crosses with catchwords
such as “Freedom” or “Democracy” planted one next to another on Catalan
beaches make them look like a cemetery57. Some consider it a threat to tour-
ism which generates most of the Catalan revenue, and an act disparaging
the memorials-cemeteries commemorating the victims of World War 258.
Counteraction on the part of the constitutionalists is only to be expected
in these circumstances. For instance, in May 2018 a group of people used
lengths of fabric to arrange yellow crosses inscribed with “Democracy”
(Democràcia), “Justice” (Justícia) and “Freedom” (Llibertat) at the Mataró
beach59. However, a group of masked individuals came to the Canet del Mar
beach to remove the crosses there. Some wore esteladas, to confuse those who
guarded the crosses. In its report on the incident, Catalan journal “El Punt
Avui” described the individuals as fascists (feixistes)60.
Quite an exceptional situation was witnessed in the town Vic, where
supporters of independence filled its Plaza Mayor with 2,500 yellow crosses
in an expression of solidarity with the “political prisoners”. A number of
the crosses were then run over by a vehicle driver. The event was widely
                              
54 Torrelameu dedica els seus carrers 2018.
55 El CDR de Sabadell 2018.
56 Cervera inaugura el carrer 2018.
57 Gubern, 2018, p. 16.
58 Sánchez-Melo 2018, p. 16.
59 Coll 2018, p. 17.
60 Brugué 2018, p. 13.
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commented in Spanish and Catalan press. In the opinion of the mayor of Vic,
the act was an assault on the freedom of speech61.
Umbrellas have also become weapons in the symbolic warfare. In August
2018, a group of people opposing secession left umbrellas in the colours of
the Spanish flag at the Arenys de Mar beach in Barcelona, as a response to
the yellow crosses and lazos62. A similar initiative was carried out at the beach
of Montgat (Maresme) by way of countermove to the yellow umbrellas
placed at the beach in Fosca de Palamós63. That peculiar campaign was
organized by the “España Ciudadana”, a platform affiliated with the political
party Ciudadanos. As part of the campaign, a light aircraft was also used to
fly over all Catalan beaches trailing a banner reading “Spain. Away with the
yellow ribbons. Beaches are for everyone”64.
In Girona, pro-independence activists hung 2,000 chains that were sup-
posed to symbolize repressive measures that Spain brought to bear on Cata-
lonia. As part of the undertaking, they also set up 300 chairs with black
silhouettes on yellow background – epitomizing the citizens of Catalonia – as
well as portraits of the incarcerated leaders of the independence movement to
accompany those. On top of that, there were a number of estaladas, a scythe,
the symbol of harvesters that draws on the war of 1640 which brought about
the first Catalan secession, and slogans: “Dignitat” (Dignity), “Llibertat”
(Liberty), “Esperança” (Hope), and “República” (Republic). The banner reading
“Estat espanyol” (Spanish State) was flanked by rojigualdas and slogans such
as “Odi” (Hatred), “Opressió” (Oppression) and “Feixisme” (Fascism)65.
In Catalonia, the war of symbols is also staged on the sidewalks, streets
and motorways. A variety of slogans can be found there, including those
referring to Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution (Fig. 15), or demanding
freedom for political prisoners (Fig. 16), sometimes with the counter-slogan
“Onward Spain” (Fig. 17). In El Catllar (Tarragona), one of the streets was
entirely painted over with yellow ribbons. At the motorways, there have been
frequent situations where a group of persons on the overpass would wave
esteladas and display pro-independence slogans to the drivers below66.
Opponents of secession meet in similar places to brandish flags of Spain and
show that Catalonia is its part.
                              
61 Un coche derriba cruces amarillas 2018.
62 Plantan una decena de "sombrillas españolas" 2018.
63 Cataluña es España 2018.
64 Lanzan campaña aérea 2018.
65 Soberanistas ofrecen apadrinar cadenas 2018, Hispanofobia en Gerona 2018.
66 Cf. Instalan una pancarta independentista 2018.
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Marc Augé included motorways (as well as petrol stations, railway termi-
nals, airports or supermarkets) among the “non-places” where people engage
in interactions only with particular texts, without creating any unique iden-
tity or relationship. He argues that:
If a place can be defined as relational, historical and concerned with identity, then
a space which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with
identity will be a non-place67.
In the case of motorways, their characteristic is that they inform drivers
about specific places by means of signs and boards, by virtue of which
“in a sense, the traveller is absolved of the need to stop or even look”68.
According to Augé, some of those places “exist only through the words
that evoke them, and in this sense they are non-places, or rather. imaginary
places: banal utopias, clichés”69.
In my opinion, the Catalan war of symbols has led to a situation where the
concept of the French philosopher is invalidated. Both the supporters of
Catalan independence and its adversaries use Catalan motorways to manifest
their views and display particular symbols: esteladas, lazos amarillos, slogans
or flags of Spain, all as part of the identity dispute. An interesting related
practice can be noted here: the letter “E” for Spain on the number plates of
scooters, motorbikes and cars (in the blue section where it is surrounded by
the 12 EU stars) is covered by a special sticker with the abbreviation “CAT”
denoting Catalonia. In this fashion, users of the vehicles demonstrate their
support of the idea of the Catalan Republic. During my four-month stay in
Barcelona, I encountered a total of eight vehicles (seven scooters and one
PCV), whose plates were thus – illegally – marked, evincing revindication
sentiments (Fig. 18). Eduard Goligorsky referred to those as “plates of
honour” (matrículas de honor)70. The use of pro-independence stickers on
number plates is not a new practice, as it dates back to the early 21st century,
when the association DesmarCAT called upon people to replace the “E” in
the circle of EU stars with “CAT”, while certain newspapers, e.g. “La Van-
guardia”, offered the stickers with their paper issues71. However, my observa-
tions indicate that they are not greatly popular.
                              
67 Augé 2010, p. 53.
68 Ibidem, pp. 65-66.
69 Ibidem, p. 65.
70 Goligorsky 2002, p. 46.
71 Ibidem, pp. 46-47.
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Consequently, those who travel on the motorways of Catalonia cannot
help being exposed to varied manifestations of identity. Numerous drivers
express their support or objection when they pass such symbols by sounding
their horns. The Catalan war of symbols shows the degree to which political
struggle engenders colonization of spaces which by definition can hardly
serve to build identity. In the case of Catalonia, specific symbols introduced
in the area of streets and motorways – flags, banners, or yellow ribbons –
effect a change, temporary though it may be, of those spaces into locations
which are linked to the historical-political situation (seeking separation from
Spain or maintaining unity) reflected in particular identity projects (Catalans
and Spaniards together, only Catalans and/or only Spaniards).
As the polysemous game continues to be played in Catalonia, numerous
inhabitants find it aggravating that independence symbols are placed on the
official building of municipal authorities in Catalonia72. They consider it to
be an expression of bias and disrespect towards those who do not subscribe
to the idea of independence. Also, much controversy is aroused by the activi-
ties of Mossos d'Esquadra, the Catalan police, which consist in identifying
persons who take down pro-independence symbols.
DAILY BANALIZATION OF NATIONALISM
The widespread use of flags and diverse symbols in the Catalan space is in
line with the concept of banal nationalism, in which “nationhood is near the
surface of contemporary life”73. The mundane display of Catalan symbols,
the señeras and esteladas as well as banners with pro-independence slogans
drive the habituation process of the Catalan community one the one hand
and serve to de-habituate the Spanish nation on the other. A relatively
straightforward principle operates here: the greater the number of flags, sym-
bols and signs affirming Catalan-ness and Catalonia, the less visibility will be
afforded to the Spanish symbols. The multiplicity of Catalan symbols and
their daily use renders them a part of the routine, a banal element, whilst
dispossessing Spanish symbols and thus enfeebling the link with Spain.
                              
72 In July 2018, the High Court of Justice of Catalonia (TSJC) issued an order to the authorities
of Sant Cugat del Vallès (Barcelona) requesting removal of the estelada, with the rationale that by
displaying a symbol of a political party in public space the authorities violate the neutrality princi-
ple, while public institutions are not entitled to invoke the right to free speech. Piñol 2018.
73 Billig 2008, p. 175.
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As Jesús Laínz put it, all symbols serve to “engender an imaginary awareness
of nationhood that is remote from Spain (…) and symbolize in the eyes of
the world that Catalonia is not Spain”74. Others draw attention to the neces-
sity of constant indoctrination on the part of Catalan nationalists, and their
exploitation of xenophobia, without which they would not be able to hold
on to power75.
Without doubt, “hot nationalism” (the official, state variant), would not
be successful without the “daily practices, habitual actions and ideological
convictions”76. Their purpose is to produce a permanent notional cliché asso-
ciated with the flagged objects. As Billig writes:
Precisely the processes of banal nationalism enable developed states their contin-
ued existence. The very same processes provide model aspirations to peoples who
believe that they are denied the right to national independence. In this sense,
nationalism is a permanent trait of the world today, not some peripheral factor
which flares up from time to time77.
In this context, Catalonia represents an instance of its own. On the one
hand, despite the fact that Catalan nationalism is a “cold” one, resting on
banalization, one cannot speak here of seeking to reproduce a nation state
because the Catalan state in the shape of a republic has not been established.
On the other hand, Catalan nationalism strives to change the political map of
Spain and Europe, which materializes in the quotidian practice of marking
space with flags and signs. The Catalan community, or at least its substantial
proportion, entertain the conviction that Catalonia is a nation lacking a state.
The daily banalization practices serve to sustain the conceived idea of the
Catalan Republic. What is more, banalization as a manifestation of the “cold”
nationalism which ensures success to the “hot” one has led to a situation
where banalization is being banalized today. Many persons who were previ-
ously unaware of the banality of certain symbols in the social space are aware
of it now, and in spite of treating the banalized symbols seriously, banalize
them at the same time in everyday life. Jordi Canal goes as far as calling it an
“independence fad” (una moda indepe), evinced in patriotic production of
various items featuring independence symbols (phone cases, helmets, bands,
necklaces, cobs, watches, pendants, etc.)78. Then again, at least half of the in-
habitants of Catalonia do not yield to the banalization, as the flag-inundated
                              
74 Laínz 2007 p. 79.
75 Tortella et al. 2016, p. 476.
76 Billig 2008, p. 9.
77 Ibidem, pp. 15-16.
78 Canal 2018, pp. 330-332.
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space cause resistance and counteraction. One could say that the greatest
weakness of banalization of nationalism in Catalonia is the inability of exerting
influence on the entire community. Banal nationalism did not result in social
homogenization in Catalonia, and in this respect the success of “cold national-
ism” is incomplete, which subsequently translates into “hot nationalism”.
Consequently, the percentage of Catalans who are in favour of independence
amounts to “mere” 47%.
The war of symbols in Catalonia shows that banal nationalism may rein-
force the “hot” variety, but it can banalize it too. After all, people consciously
use either Catalan or Spanish flags and symbols (political use) but, being
ubiquitously present on a daily basis and having become a product for sale,
they descend into banality. This daily banalization of nationalism help to
forge hard nationalism but its strength is thus undermined. For instance,
each Chinese shop in Catalonia sells both Spanish flags and esteladas, as well
as other gadgets bearing the symbols of Catalonia and Spain. Many Catalans
wear lazos amarillos bought from Chinese who made it themselves, using
a length of ribbon and an ordinary safety pin.
CONCLUSIONS
One of the upshots of the mass flagging of Catalan space with pro-
independence symbols is that flags of Spain are displayed not only in Catalo-
nia but also in the entire country. These spontaneous acts may be interpreted
as a political declaration and a statement of identity, an affirmation of
Spanishness and Spain’s unity. The streets of Zaragoza provide a telling
example, giving the impression of an ongoing national holiday. Spanish flags
are seen on most buildings, but there is no single estelada in sight. In these
circumstances, some even speak of a revival of Spanish patriotism and pride
in national symbols79, which previously were not so readily exhibited due to
connotations with the Francoist regime. Naturally, a proportion of Catalans
is likely to consider it a manifestation of the centralist nationalism, which
would like to see any Catalan symbol suppressed, as it did take place during
the times of José Primo de Rivera and Francisco Franco. Today, Spaniards no
longer have to wait for the matches of La Roja to be able to hang out national
flags, flagging the space of the country on a daily basis. Again, the mass pres-
                              
79 Quiroga and Achilles 2018, pp. IX-XI.
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ence of the Spanish flag increases its value on the one hand whilst causing its
symbolic devaluation in the process of banalization on the other. Thus, the
war of symbols transforms them into “articles of patriotic consumption”80
and results in double banalization of both Catalan and Spanish symbols.
According to Josep Colomer, that symbolic rift in the Spanish society
should be attributed not only to political instability and frequent change of
governments, but also attests to poor social cohesion81. Colomer, a political
scientist from Barcelona, emphasizes that banalizations of patriotism are not
widespread in Spain, but owe their limited scope to resignation, indifference,
discomfort and rejection of aggression82. However, one can hardly concur
with the view as far as Catalonia is concerned, whose community is divided
as never before. Its members are actively involved in marking their territories
and asserting identity with symbols, which clash in the streets of Catalonia
day by day. One side puts out their yellow ribbons, esteladas and yellow
crosses, the other attempt to remove them. Actions of that kind frequently
entail aggression or violence, not to mention visual perpetuation through
videos posted online. All that causes tension to mount and the social divi-
sions to deepen (Fig. 19). One can barely resist the impression that Catalonia
finds itself on the brink of a civil war.
CATALONIA 2018:
CLASHING IDENTITIES IN PUBLIC SPACE
Summary
The current political situation is Catalonia engenders grave social tension. The
Catalan community is far from homogeneous, being divided into two hostile camps:
the constitucionalistes, supporters of Spanish unity and the rights guaranteed under
the Constitution of 1978, and the independentistas, adherents of the independence of
Catalonia envisaged as a republic. Catalonia today witnesses semantic and polyse-
mous rivalry, having become an arena to the war of symbols, flags, signs and identi-
ties. Ceaseless contest is taking place in the Catalan public space, where people claim
the right to manifest distinct identities and political views, evinced in the simultane-
ous presence of the pro-independence flag called estelada, the official Catalan flag
                              
80 Moreno Luzón and Núñez Seixas 2017, p. 423.
81 Colomer 2018, p. 171.
82 Ibidem, p. 172.
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known as señera and the national Spanish rojigualda. Slogans such as “Away with
the monarchy!”, “Catalan Republic” or “Fuck Spain!” clash with “Long live the
king!”, “Long live Spain!” and “Screw Catalonia!”. Contrary to widely held opinions,
the author argues that the struggle for freedom and free speech in Catalonia after
October 1st, 2017 – excluding evident instances of violation of such rights – attest to
the polysemous nature of the Catalan community in what is the most severe political
crisis that the Iberian Peninsula has experienced in the 21st century.
Fig. 1. “Free political prisoners” in Catalan in one of the main streets of Barcelona.
All photographs made in Barcelona by Filip Kubiaczyk.
FILIP KUBIACZYK, CATALONIA 2018: CLASHING IDENTITIES IN PUBLIC SPACE
269
Fig. 2. Sticker with the slogan “Catalan Republic” (in Catalan) under a street name plate.
Fig. 3. Flags of Spain on a building in Barcelona.
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Fig. 4. A building dominated by esteladas.
Fig. 5. The estelada accompanied by ikurriña.
FILIP KUBIACZYK, CATALONIA 2018: CLASHING IDENTITIES IN PUBLIC SPACE
271
Fig. 6. Flag of Spain combined with the señera and the flag of the European Union.
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Fig. 7. Flag with a slogan in Catalan: “Catalonia, a new state in Europe”.
Fig. 8. Fence decorated with lazos amarillos.
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Fig. 9. Building on which the señera, the estelada, a lazo amarillo and the rojigualda can
be seen together.
Fig. 10. Lazo amarillo changed into a lazo in Spanish colours.
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Fig. 11. A wall with the inscription reading “Catalan Republic” in Catalan and the
estelada drawn next to it.
Fig. 12. The text in English, “Free all catalan political prisoners”, has been painted on
a wall by the walkway to the beach.
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Fig. 13. The drawing on a sidewalk in the centre of Barcelona, showing a police officer
beating a person, has been supplied with the message in English: “Spain: fake democracy”.
Fig. 14. “Bon dia República” (Good Morning Republic) with a lazo, painted on outer doors.
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Fig. 15.  The crossed-through figure of 155 protests the suspension of the autonomy of
Catalonia under Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution.
Fig. 16. Inscription on the sidewalk reading “Free political prisoners” complemented
with a lazo amarillo.
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Fig. 17. The Catalan text on a wall, “Free political prisoners!”, has been countered with
the slogan “Onward Spain”.
Fig. 18. The standard symbol for Spain on the licence plate of this scooter (E) has been
replaced with a sticker saying CAT (for Catalonia) and matching EU iconography.
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Fig. 19. These two inscriptions (both in Catalan) on a building wall respectively assert
“Fuck Spain” and “Fuck Catalonia”.
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